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Abstract  
The “Single European Sky ATM Research” 
(SESAR) is the collaborative project that is 
intended to completely modernise the European 
airspace and its Air Traffic Management. It 
represents the technological dimension of the 
Single European Sky initiative launched by the 
European Commission. The total estimated cost 
of its development phase is € 2.1 billion, to be 
shared equally between the European 
Community, EUROCONTROL and industry. 
One high-level goal to be met is the 
improvement of safety by a factor of 10. The 
increase of runway safety is amongst these 
topics. In this context runway incursions shall 
be reduced. They are defined by ICAO Doc 
9870 as “any occurrence at an aerodrome 
involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, 
vehicle or person on the protected area of a 
surface designated for the landing and Take Off 
of aircraft.”  
According to the German Air Navigation 
Service Provider (ANSP) DFS Deutsche 
Flugsicherung GmbH, 66 runway incursions 
occurred in Germany in 2011 of which 12% 
were caused by Air Traffic Controllers 
(ATCOs). In order to prevent incidents or 
accidents in this particular cause, an additional 
new safety net was created.   
 
Currently the only safety net available to Tower 
Runway Controllers is the Runway Incursion 
Monitoring System (RIMS). It uses Advanced 
Surface Movement Guidance and Control 
System (A-SMGCS) Surveillance data to detect 
dangerous situations within the runway 
protected area. Detections and subsequent alerts 
to controllers are provided at the very last 
moment and require immediate reaction. 
 
The “Conflicting ATC Clearances Safety Net 
will detect conflicting ATC clearances much 
earlier – when the ATCO inputs clearances into 
the Electronic Flight Strips (EFS), which are 
already in operational use in many control 
towers. Therefore, it will perform crosschecks 
with the clearances input on the EFS, and in 
most cases the aircraft position, to see if the 
given inputs violate the rules and procedures at 
the concerned airport, which could lead to a 
hazardous situation. The new safety net will not 
replace the existing RIMS but is intended as an 
additional layer of safety. 
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In the framework of SESAR, and co-financed 
by the European Community and 
EUROCONTROL, a validation exercise 
studying Conflicting ATC Clearances was 
performed by DFS at Hamburg Airport between 
the 26th and 30th November 2012. Industrial 
prototypes were integrated and used in the 
Airport Research Facility in order to provide the 
appropriate validation platform. The prototypes 
were developed by DFS, and after a period of 
off-site testing the necessary equipment was 
successfully installed and used for the 
validation.  
 
The developed “Conflicting ATC Clearances 
safety net” for Hamburg Airport takes particular 
operational characteristics of the airport (i.e. 
crossing runway layout) into account. 
Furthermore DFS considered recommendations 
from V2 validation trials 2011 in Luxembourg. 
It was recommended here, that the detection of 
Take Off versus Line Up and Line Up versus 
Take Off should be fine-tuned so that the 
system takes into account the line-up point of 
the taxiing aircraft and not the actual position of 
the aircraft. This would prevent the false alarm 
that is triggered when the aircraft that was due 
to line up would be still taxiing on the taxiway 
parallel to the runway but is in front of the 
aircraft taking off, but the line-up point is 
behind the aircraft taking off.   
An additional routing function by DFS was 
integrated in the validation platform. The 
conflicting ATC clearance function bases on 
this routing function. Another suggestion from 
V2 Trials was a predictive indication. This was 
also integrated in the Industry Based Platform 
 
The main aim was to evaluate the Conflicting 
ATC Clearance concept in a realistic 
environment using operational ATCOs. This 
was achieved by using six active and one retired 
ATCOs from Hamburg (HAM) airport in 
Germany, and one active ATCO each from 
XFW (Hamburg Finkenwerder, Germany), LEJ 
(Leipzig, Germany), KLU (Klagenfurt, Austria) 
and SUF (Lamezia Terme, Italy). The ATCOs 
performed three shadow mode trials per day. In 
each trial they assessed different situations 
where the ATCOs entered Conflicting ATC 
Clearances into the Electronic Flight Strips.  
 
An example of a Conflicting ATC Clearance is 
when the ATCO gives clearances to two or 
more aircraft at the same time and for the same 
runway. 
The figure 1 below shows a line up versus land 
conflict. 
 
 
Figure 1 Land vs. Line up Conflict 
In this case, the ATCO cleared the taxiing 
aircraft (SES 2001) for line up and the 
approaching aircraft (SES 4001) for landing. 
 
This paper focuses on the validation supported 
by DLR, DFS and EUROCONTROL. First of 
all operational feasibility had to be validated in 
order to clarify in which situations the system 
helps at its best. At the same time it was 
checked if certain conflicting ATC clearances 
alerts can be regarded as nuisance alerts, e.g. in 
case of conditional clearances.  
The validation was located outside the control 
tower environment so as not to interfere or 
disturb the active controllers and pilots at the 
time. 
ATCOs had to follow the real traffic with no 
intervention but acting as if they were in charge 
of the traffic. Additional synthetic traffic was 
used to create pre-conditions for conflicting 
clearance. Another reason for the synthetic 
traffic was that it was not always possible to use 
real traffic for different situations e.g. there was 
not enough real traffic. On the ATCOs’ HMI 
there was no difference between real or 
synthetic traffic.  
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The ATCOs inserted clearances via the EFS, 
e.g. a landing clearance. On request of the 
validation team the ATCO then was asked to 
input a ‘conflicting’ clearance, e.g. a line-up 
clearance for a synthetic aircraft, to check the 
feasibility and functionality of this dedicated 
alert. 
Evaluation methods included data logging, 
questionnaires and debriefings after each 
session and at the end of the day. Both the 
system’s response times in situations with 
conflicting clearances and the ATCOs’ response 
to the systems alerts were logged. Furthermore 
it was assessed whether the correct type of alert 
was triggered by the system and if false alerts 
were kept to an acceptable level.  
A specific questionnaire was designed to assess 
operational feasibility according to the ATCOs 
after their use of the Conflicting ATC 
Clearances System during the shadow mode 
trials. 
Debriefing sessions with ATCOs, operational 
experts, and developers were conducted to 
analyse which alarms were a nuisance for the 
ATCO and which alarms were perceived as 
being a useful safety net.  
 
Binomial tests were performed to show 
statistically significant ATCO feed-back in the 
questionnaire. 
 
We will present results from the questionnaires 
to reveal the degree of the ATCOs’ acceptance 
and usability for different types of alerts. In 
conclusion, response times of the users and the 
system will be presented. These results are the 
key to fine tune the new safety net for 
operational use. 
 
Our report will conclude presenting a set of 
future safety nets, starting with the conflicting 
ATC clearances safety net, the inclusion of an 
additional conformance monitoring system, 
completed with the Runway Incursion 
Monitoring System. 
 
